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Abstract: As an EU policy agenda, the ―knowledge-based bio-economy‖ (KBBE) 
emphasizes bio-technoscience as the means to reconcile environmental and economic 
sustainability. This frames the sustainability problem as an inefficiency to be  
overcome through a techno-knowledge fix. Here ecological sustainability means a benign  
eco-efficient productivity using resources which are renewable, reproducible and therefore 
sustainable. The KBBE narrative has been elaborated by European Technology Platforms 
in the agri-food-forestry-biofuels sectors, whose proposals shape research priorities. These 
inform policy agendas for the neoliberalization of both nature and knowledge, especially 
through intellectual property. In these ways, the KBBE can be understood as a new 
political-economic strategy for sustainable capital. This strategy invests great expectations 
for unlocking the productive potential of natural resources through a techno-knowledge fix. 
Although eco-efficiency is sometimes equated with biological productivity, commercial 
success will be dependent upon new combinations of ―living‖ and ―dead‖ labour.  
Keywords: knowledge-based bio-economy; European Technology Platforms; innovation 
narratives; techno-knowledge fix; neoliberal nature; sustainable capital 
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1. Introduction 
European Union institutions continuously elaborate visions of imagined futures. As exemplified by 
the 2000 Lisbon Strategy [1], the Europe Union was meant to become the world‘s leading 
―knowledge-based economy‖ (KBE) by 2010, where knowledge is closely linked with technological 
innovation. Whether or not such imagined futures are achieved is less important than their role in 
shaping political-economic policies, institutional practices and wider societal changes. These changes 
are promoted through master narratives, such as the KBE, conflating technological advance with 
societal progress [2].  
One increasingly important narrative is the ―knowledge-based bio-economy‖ (KBBE). According to 
the European Commission, the KBBE is ―the sustainable, eco-efficient transformation of renewable 
biological resources into health, food, energy and other industrial products‖ [3]. This has been 
elaborated through a partnership between EU institutions and European Technology Platforms (ETPs) 
in the agro-food-forestry-biofuels sectors. These ETPs produce vision documents and strategic 
research agendas that shape public research funding priorities through particular framings of natural 
resources, future markets and societal progress. This informs broad research and innovation policy, 
especially in relation to Framework Programme 7 (FP7). 
This paper explores the following questions: How does the KBBE narrative favour a specific 
account of sustainability? Towards what wider aims? What alternative narratives contend for influence?  
Although the KBBE concept could have imagined diverse futures, in practice it has favoured 
European policy frameworks around specific technological choices and neoliberal accounts of nature. 
The KBBE narrative discursively frames economic and environmental crises in ways that favour 
particular solutions, while demoting other potential solutions. In turn, the narrative promotes changes 
in wider policy frameworks constituting specific strategies as necessary and feasible. 
Alongside supporting the extension of neoliberal market-like rule, the KBBE also elaborates an 
ecological vision reconciling environmental and economic sustainability. Here renewable is equated 
with sustainable, thus naturalizing a particular political-economic strategy. In this vision, technological 
innovation unlocks the renewable, biophysical characteristics of nature itself through genetic and  
bio-molecular knowledge, thus enabling the continuing expansion and accumulation of capital. This 
can be analyzed as a techno-knowledge fix, which provides a basis for creating sustainable capital, not 
just sustainable capitalism. 
In order to carry out this analysis, we draw upon theoretical literature from geography on 
neoliberalization of nature [4,5]. We aim to show how the KBBE narrative reflects a specific  
techno-knowledge fix based on the harnessing and commodification of genetic and bio-molecular 
science in the intensification of natural productivity for commercial exploitation. This has been 
theorized as the real subsumption of nature by Boyd et al. [6]. We first outline the theoretical 
discussions around the neoliberalization of nature, before applying these insights to the KBBE 
narrative and its particular framing of sustainability. Then we apply these insights to the dominant 
KBBE narrative and its particular framing of sustainability—by contrast to some alternative,  
agro-ecological agendas. Finally we summarize those divergent agendas and comment on future 
prospects within the EU policy context.  
 
Sustainability 2010, 2              
 
 
2900 
2. Neoliberal Natures and Sustainable Capital 
Over the last few years, geographers have built up a considerable body of work focusing on the 
neoliberalization of ―nature‖ or, more precisely, the neoliberalizations of natures. Noel Castree [4,5], 
for example, has provided an extensive review of this material exploring the different logics, processes, 
effects and evaluations of neoliberalism in relation to different natural resources. In reviewing this 
material, Castree ([4], p. 137) draws attention to the ―variants (or modalities) of nature‘s 
neoliberalisation‖; he thereby highlights the need to think not only about the varied nature of 
neoliberalization as a process (i.e., varieties of neoliberalism), but also ―the biophysical influence of 
nature in the neoliberalisation process‖ (i.e., varieties of nature) [4]. This latter point has also been 
made more generally by Gavin Bridge with regards to the emerging programme around environmental 
economic geography [7]; namely, that we need to consider how the biophysical characteristics of 
different natures, or natural resources, ―make a difference to the functioning of economic processes‖ 
([7], p. 79).  
Although this is an important research agenda in its own right, we still have to consider how nature 
is made into (or ‗becomes‘) a ―resource‖—an issue which Bridge has considered elsewhere [8]. In this 
other article, he argues that resources are political constructs. Although they may be unstable and 
heterogeneous constructs because of competing and contrasting interests, ―resources ―become‖ only 
through the triumph of one imaginary over others‖ ([8], p. 1221). Thus the construction of natural 
resources depends upon particular narratives, visions and knowledges that justify particular policies, 
whilst at the same time pre-empting other possibilities. 
With regards to the neoliberalization of nature, this means that we need to consider the various 
processes that constitute nature‘s neoliberalization. This entails numerous different (and often 
contradictory) processes including privatization (e.g., of land), marketization (e.g., of air), deregulation 
(e.g., of environmental protection), reregulation (e.g., biodiversity), liberalization (e.g., of trade in 
resources), competitiveness (e.g., in resource markets) and so on. Some literature has analyzed how 
these diverse neoliberal processes are variously framed in policy narratives as problems (e.g., loss of 
global market competition in natural resources), opportunities (e.g., marketization of natural resources) 
and solutions (e.g., liberalization of natural resource trade) [9]. In turn, such policy narratives, 
discourses and visions help to constitute nature as a freely available ―resource‖. Such narratives are 
based upon a neoliberal ethic underpinned by the idea that ―free‖ markets, ―free‖ market exchange and 
a ―free‖ market logic should be the core organizing principles of economic, social, and political 
relations [10,11]. Furthermore these policy narratives inform the procedures and institutions that drive 
the neoliberalisation of nature through the production of new knowledge.  
Neoliberal processes operate in recursive rather than linear ways. Privatization of natural resources 
does not directly liberalize their trade, nor their discursive enrolment in the political construction of 
resources. Rather these neoliberal processes circulate through policy narratives in contradictory ways 
as they are enrolled to support particular policy positions, specific political interests and distinct 
institutional concerns. In this sense, the policy and natural world are closely entwined in the 
construction of natural resources. The policy world, in turn, is more than an array of different 
narratives, arrangements and mechanisms; it consists of broader policy frameworks which frame 
particular forms of policy-making and implementation as necessary, understandable and ultimately 
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feasible [12]. These policy frameworks consist of the wider social, political and economic geographies 
in which decision-makers work. Such policy work consists of policy analysis, the construction of 
policy visions, the outlining of policy prescriptions, the modes of policy implementation, amongst 
other things.  
In much of the world today, the dominant policy framework embeds neoliberal narratives that 
construct natural resources in particular ways. As Charles Thorpe argues, this construction entails the 
―decontextualisation, reification, and commodification of the productive and reproductive capacities of 
living things‖ in the pursuit of profit [13]. For a long time, this has meant transforming nature into 
resources through commodification following extraction; this can be seen as the ―formal subsumption 
of nature‖, by analogy to labour exploitation. It also increasingly involves the ―intensification of 
biological productivity (i.e., yield, turnover time, metabolism, photosynthetic efficiency)‖—or the 
―real subsumption of nature‖. Nature ―is (re)made to work harder, faster and better‖, according to 
Boyd et al. ([6], pp. 563-564)  
The latter imposes capitalist logics on nature in ways that transcend the processes of privatization 
and commodification [14]. It reorients the biophysical characteristics of nature by devising new 
knowledge and technologies in order to increase productivity and thereby the accumulation of capital. 
As Boyd et al. note [6], this analysis cannot assume the predictable compliance of nature to 
intensification efforts, thus leaving room for both pleasant and nasty surprises.  
Policy frameworks embedding neoliberal narratives go beyond David Harvey‘s concept of 
―accumulation by dispossession‖ [15]. The latter primarily relates to the privatization of ―common‖  
(or shared) resources which concerns the ―opening up of new arenas for investment and accumulation‖, 
according to Himley ([16], p. 443) Neoliberal policy frameworks also rework natural resources 
through new knowledge and technoscientific developments, which are themselves built upon the logics, 
strategies and expectations of capitalist accumulation through state-led (and -protected) market 
exchange. Thus the neoliberalisation of nature is tied to the neoliberalisation of knowledge, both of 
which can be seen in these wider policy frameworks that support and promulgate the real subsumption 
of nature through new knowledge to a capitalist logic. 
These policy narratives, visions and expectations depend upon the reciprocal circulation of 
neoliberal concepts throughout policy frameworks; issues are variously identified as problems or 
threats, opportunities, and solutions. Moreover, there is a new discursive emphasis relating to natural 
resources that goes beyond the emphasis on commodification. It marks a distinction between the 
formal and real subsumption of nature highlighted above [6]. On the one hand, there is a continuing 
discursive emphasis on the idea of an ―ecological fix‖, which Karen Bakker ([17], p. 1782) defines as 
―strategies of externalization and internalization of socioenvironmental conditions, in search of profit, 
both by states and by capitalists‖. The ecological fix relates to the externalizing of costs by firms  
(e.g., pollution), which can then provide opportunities for further capital accumulation by the same or 
other firms (e.g., emissions trading) [16,17]. On the other hand, there is increasing emphasis on a 
―technological fix‖ to ecological and economic crises, in which new knowledge and technoscientific 
developments (or imaginaries in many cases) are enrolled in the real subsumption of nature through its 
intensification by increasing the productivity of natural resources.  
The real subsumption of nature necessitates new knowledge to create a technological fix or, more 
accurately, a ―techno-knowledge fix‖. This latter concept adds to debates on the neoliberalization of 
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nature, primarily because it illustrates processes broader than the privatization and commodification of 
natural resources. Although these processes remain relevant, it is the privatization and 
commodification of techno-knowledges that enable the real subsumption of nature, thus introducing 
the key novel feature of a new political economic strategy. For example, the introduction of new 
fertilizer technologies or genetically engineered crops, designed to increase crop yields, requires an 
―increase (in the) reliability, predictability, efficiency, and control‖ of nature, regardless of whether it 
commodifies ―nature‖ [13]. To capture value from this control necessitates the privatization and 
commodification of new knowledge, rather than nature itself. Biophysical characteristics of nature 
may prove recalcitrant to more efficient use, so there is no way to ensure predictability or control of 
nature prior to implementing new technologies [4,7]. Thus the neoliberalization of nature depends 
upon privatizing knowledge of biophysical function rather than biophysical form; this marks an 
important distinction between the formal and real subsumption of nature.  
This real subsumption of nature depends on an emerging political-economic strategy based on the 
idea of sustainable capital (and not just ―sustainable capitalism‖), as a shift from earlier regimes. 
Classically, capital accumulation has been ―vampiric‖ in utilizing energy and natural resources, thus 
wasting them. Not merely negligent, such waste has resulted from the drive to increase labour 
productivity. This has been the ―chosen metric of wealth in the capitalist era‖ ([18], p. 9). By contrast, 
in the KBBE narrative, resources become forever renewable through new technoscientific 
developments which improve the efficiency and intensity of resource usage. Economic growth can 
thereby avoid the ―Jevons Paradox‖ whereby falling resource costs—as a consequence of increasing 
productivity—lead to increasing demand for resources and their potential depletion [8].  
As an implicit concept, sustainable capital is built on potentially new forms of capital formation, 
energy and labour power. In some accounts, renewable resources even provide new forms of surplus 
value generated by nature itself [19]. By contrast, other analyses leave aside the question of whether or 
how the real subsumption of nature may depend on human labour. According to Boyd et al.: 
―In adapting these (subsumption) concepts to analyze nature-based industries, our aim is 
not to devalue the place of human labor in the production process, nor to engage the 
complex involutions of value theory. Rather, we use these concepts as a means to highlight 
some of the different ways in which biophysical systems are industrialized and, in some 
cases, made to operate as productive forces in and of themselves‖ ([6], p. 562).  
Regardless of labour‘s role, some natural resources are seen as inherently sustainable and/or  
eco-efficient because they are renewable. As long as their productivity can be intensified, they will be 
able to replace existing (and wasteful) inputs in production (e.g., fossil fuels, capital derived from 
petroleum-dependent industries etc.). Their biophysical characteristics—i.e., their function rather than 
form—are discursively conflated with capital. This conflation brings the promise of capital that is 
sustainable and/or efficient because it is renewable. In this cornucopian vision, certain forms of natural 
resources and their usage can reconcile economic with environmental sustainability. Life itself is 
characterized as capital, forever renewable and forever productive. Thus nature is meant to sustain 
capitalism through its own inherent renewability. 
As a strategy, sustainable capital is based on certain assumptions about the biophysical 
characteristics of nature. It is based on the view that ―living matter‖ (e.g., plants, animals,  
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micro-organisms etc.) is an inherently sustainable resource because it is inherently renewable, in that 
new living matter can reproduce or be (re)produced. In some accounts, it is also supposed to be 
inherently efficient because it does not require new forms of capital, nor new energy-intensive 
production processes, nor greater labour productivity—because the living matter itself can be made 
more productive.  
In this perspective, living matter is intensified through knowledge that promotes the real 
subsumption of life itself [6]. To achieve such intensification, however, necessitates a concurrent 
commodification of techno-knowledge to ensure the ascendance of sustainable capital as a  
political-economic reality in the future. So it is important to study the narratives that promote, 
legitimize and justify new technological developments leading to the intensification and privatization 
of life.  
3. Extending the “Techno-knowledge Fix” through the Knowledge-based Bio-economy 
Since the early 1990s, the European Commission has increasingly supported the idea that economic 
growth and development will be dependent upon new, often science-based sectors such as the life 
sciences. This view has been driven by a broader competitiveness agenda in which the threat of 
international competition from economic globalization has justified the ongoing reform of European 
institutions, strategies and policy frameworks. This wholesale reorientation is exemplified in various 
grand agendas such as the recent Europe 2020 Strategy, which extends the 2000 Lisbon Strategy by 
promoting ―smart, sustainable and inclusive growth‖. Such agendas are also pursued alongside the 
political integration project, starting with the 1987 Single European Act through to the 2007  
Lisbon Treaty. 
These political-economic changes to the European Union are thoroughly entwined with neoliberal 
agendas. These generally involve, the ―mobilization of state power in the contradictory extension and 
reproduction of market(-like) rule‖, argue Tickell and Peck ([20], p. 166). Through ―market-friendly‖ 
regulations, neoliberal policies have extended various processes such as deregulation, privatization, 
commodification etc., thereby creating new forms of market relations. [11]. The neoliberalization 
process also promotes a technological fix which ―relies on the coercive powers of competition‖; this 
―becomes so deeply embedded in entrepreneurial common sense, however, that it becomes a fetish 
belief: that there is a technological fix for each and every problem‖, according to David Harvey  
([10], p. 68).  
Imperatives for a ―technological fix‖ have a long history in EU policy circles. In the 1980s, policy 
narratives presented biotechnology (and other new technologies) as a major driver of economic 
competitiveness [21]; this was later reiterated in the early 1990s with the European Commission‘s 
1993 Growth, Competitiveness, Employment White Paper, which specifically highlighted the potential 
of high-tech sectors like biotechnology. This White Paper argued that ―Comparable changes in 
productivity will be achieved by further progress in life sciences—biotechnology—through the 
creation of innovation in highly competitive areas of industry and agriculture‖ ([22], p. 92). 
Such views of the potential for high-technology growth were later embedded in the 2000 Lisbon 
Strategy, which committed the European Union to become ―the most competitive and dynamic, 
knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable growth with more and better jobs‖  
Sustainability 2010, 2              
 
 
2904 
by 2010. More explicitly, the strategy emphasized that ―technology and research represents 
tomorrow‘s jobs‖ ([1], p. 18), an emphasis that was again repeated at the Barcelona European Council 
meeting two years later., Although the technological fix has a long history, it has taken new forms in 
recent years. It is increasingly aligned with the production of a knowledge-based economy and hence a  
―techno-knowledge fix‘, as we call it. More recently this techno-knowledge fix has come to promise 
both environmental sustainability and ―sustainable‖ economic growth through greater productivity of 
natural resources. This underpins what we have conceptualized as sustainable capital. 
In this broader policy narrative, the techno-knowledge fix necessitates new institutional, societal 
and policy frameworks in order to ensure the expected flow of potential products that new 
technologies promise. This expectation is then built into policy frameworks in order to achieve it, 
though not always successfully. For example, the 2006 Aho Report highlighted the need for Europe to 
―provide an innovation-friendly market for its businesses‖; going beyond deregulation, this promoted 
―a cultural shift which celebrates innovation‖. Policy changes are necessary to facilitate ―lead markets‖, 
such as for the Life Sciences. Consequently, the report tells us to rethink our current policy 
frameworks: ―Europe and its citizens should realize that their way of life is under threat but also that 
the path to prosperity through research and innovation is open if large scale action is taken now by 
their leaders before it is too late‖ ([23], pp. 2, 6, 25). 
The techno-knowledge fix presents opportunities highlighted by the European Commission‘s  
Life Science Strategy, which envisages modern biotechnology as the ―next wave of the KBE  
[knowledge-based economy]‖ ([24], p. 3). As an ―enabling technology‖, the life sciences are expected 
to be a significant contributor to the Lisbon Strategy. As the 2007 mid-term review of the Life Science 
Strategy argues, biotechnology is essential for solving the challenges of ―health, energy supplies, 
global warming and an ageing population‖ ([25], p. 2). This expectation extends the ambitions of the 
―knowledge-based bio-economy‖ (KBBE) agenda, which was launched at a high-profile conference  
in 2005. This new concept combined the KBE narrative of the Lisbon Strategy with the OECD‘s 
proposal for a ―bioeconomy policy agenda‖ [26]. Going beyond encouraging new biotechnological 
products, the KBBE agenda is directed towards promoting, linking and capturing new forms of market 
value. According to the EU Science and Research Commissioner, the bio-economy is a vitally 
important sector, ―estimated to be worth more than €1.5 trillion per year‖ ([27], p. 1). In essence the 
KBBE exemplifies the sustainable capital strategy to develop the (re)productive powers of living 
matter in the pursuit of capital accumulation.  
As an EU-wide policy narrative, the KBBE also promotes changes in policy frameworks towards 
the pursuit of ―sustainable‖ capital accumulation. The KBBE diagnoses problems and identifies 
techno-knowledge fixes that require the removal of ―barriers‖ to the exploitation of renewable 
resources through innovation and technoscientific developments. In turn, the KBBE naturalizes a 
techno-knowledge fix based on renewable innovation as the necessary prerequisite for economic 
competitiveness which underpins all of the European Union‘s prosperity, social gains and, in the end, 
political continuity; that is, the ‗sustainability‘ of the EU itself. Thus, as in other master narratives [2], 
one specific technoscientific trajectory becomes the only path that will ensure societal progress—in 
this case, through the assumed sustainability of exploiting ―renewable‖ resources and expanding  
their availability. 
Sustainability 2010, 2              
 
 
2905 
More specifically, the KBBE is an elite master narrative focusing on research and innovation 
policy. It is entrenched in EU-wide and national policy frameworks organized and configured by 
particular research and innovation policy elites and/or bureaucracies. Therefore its role does not 
depend on popular acceptance, acquiescence or even awareness.  
Ostensibly a research policy, the KBBE appears in the overall agenda for the Framework 
Programme 7 (FP7) funding scheme, which was approved by the EU Council and Parliament. 
Furthermore, the KBBE influences national research budgets by setting agendas for the European 
Research Area (ERA), such as the ERA-Nets (e.g., KBBE-Net) and the UK‘s Technology Strategy 
Boards. As an elite master narrative, the KBBE circulates among policy elites in different places. 
Such scale-jumping means that the KBBE narrative subsumes multi-scalar policy frameworks in an 
agenda and strategy that values a specific techno-knowledge fix over others. For example, the KBBE 
fits neatly into the longer history of innovation and research narratives that have sought to justify 
broader and easier access to patents for European firms. Here the narratives identify a trans-Atlantic 
gap in biotechnology patents as the rationale for facilitating access for European companies.  
Patents have been turned into a key indicator of success or failure, and especially as a basis to 
blame Europe‘s fragmented patent regimes for lost competitiveness. Although the 1998 EC patent 
directive has a potentially broad scope [28], a biotechnological patent in one EU member state is not 
necessarily respected in all the others, especially given political and ethical disagreements. As a 
solution offered by the Commission and industrial stakeholders, a European Community Patent would 
guarantee EU-wide recognition. It would be designed ―to increase the competitiveness of the European 
Companies in providing for an effective, affordable and legally sound protection and counter the 
present trend of biotechnology companies to prefer to patent in the US‖ ([29], p. 10).  
This proposal was not enacted, so its absence can still be blamed for the lower level of innovation 
in Europe than the USA. Thus the KBBE narrative justifies the re-orientation of research and 
innovation policy frameworks towards patentable knowledge as a techno-knowledge fix for the 
societal problems and challenges facing Europe (e.g., energy security, ageing population etc.). It does 
so by promoting ―European‘ (not national) competitiveness and growth, especially by refocusing 
research and innovation policy, ―in order to foster market development for bio-based products and 
improve the uptake of new technologies‖, as in the revised Action Plan for the Life Sciences  
([25], p. 8).  
Inherent in the techno-knowledge fix underpinning sustainable capital is the need to prioritize 
specific technological sectors; this has been formulated by DG Enterprise as ―lead market initiatives‖ 
(LMI). The techno-knowledge fix will not simply work with greater investment in research and 
knowledge about renewable natural resources and eco-efficient processes. According to the 
Commission ([30], p. 2), the competitiveness problem results from the slow and/or low uptake of new 
technologies, which in turn results from ―uncertainty about product properties‖ (e.g., renewability,  
eco-efficiency etc.) as well as ―weak market transparency‖ (e.g., consumer awareness, public 
acceptance etc.).  
From this problem-diagnosis, the EU must provide ―incentives for the emergence of the bio-based 
product market‖, including regulatory changes in order to encourage certain kinds of technological 
development, product uptake and thus new markets. This entails the embedding of private interests in 
policy frameworks, e.g., easier access to patents, as well as public procurement measures favouring 
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―green‖ products. The European Association for Bioindustries (Europabio) supports these policy 
changes as a means to stimulate innovation: ―By developing support policies and measures that will 
stimulate the demand for these products, this new policy [LMI] will encourage innovation in bio-based 
products by transforming knowledge in new bioproducts and bioprocesses‖ [31].  
Overall, the KBBE narrative offers solutions that favour the development of technoscientific 
knowledge that can eventually be privatized and commodified, thereby framing that knowledge along 
lines that link societal relevance with the private interests of capital accumulation. In this sense, the 
KBBE attributes economic value to natural resources and molecular-biological science, thereby 
constituting sustainable capital as a political-economic strategy. In turn, research and innovation are 
represented as ―natural‖ processes whose success is derived from the inherent and intrinsic qualities of 
the natural resources and biological-molecular knowledge that are amenable to privatization and 
commodification, rather than from the social relations that constitute economic practices and, 
especially, capital relations [32]. Inevitably, in justifying and naturalizing a specific techno-knowledge 
fix with reference to certain societal priorities and constructions of nature as resources, the KBBE 
narrative dis-empowers or demotes other possibilities [33]. 
4. Sustainable Capital and the KBBE: Framing “Sustainability” in the European Union 
Framework Programme 7 
The KBBE narrative links together agriculture (food and crops), fisheries and biotechnology as a 
single work programme within Theme 2 of the European Commission‘s Framework Programme 7 
(FP7). It explicitly aims ―to build a knowledge-based bio-economy‖, which is discursively framed by 
the food, crops, forestry and biofuels Technology Platforms ([34], p. vii). These Technology Platforms 
were created in the European Council proposal to bring together ―technological know-how, industry, 
regulators, and financial institutions to develop a strategic vision for leading technologies‖  
([35], p. 14). The Technology Platforms are meant ―to involve all relevant stakeholders‘ in order to 
identify societal priorities, needs and future benefits. Technology Platforms formulate ―common 
visions‖ that form the basis for Strategic Research Agendas, which are then incorporated into 
Framework Programme 7 research funding priorities. As future-oriented visions, the Technology 
Platforms identify specific models of research and innovation, as the basis for specific  
techno-knowledge fixes. Although these Technology Platforms emphasize ―European‖ interests, 
priorities and competitiveness, their members or affiliates also include many trans-Atlantic 
multinationals. 
4.1. Renewable = Sustainable 
In seeking to combine different stakeholders and research agendas, the KBBE narrative specifies 
particular research and innovation priorities centred on ―renewable‖ and ―eco-efficient‖ natural 
resources. According to the Commission: 
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―Renewable biological resources are the basis of a European knowledge based  
bio-economy (food, feed, agriculture, forest based, fisheries, aquaculture, biochemistry, 
etc.) that today has an estimated annual turn-over of more than €1,500 million. The 
increasing demand for biological resources, both in quantity and quality, can only be met 
through innovation and advancement of knowledge in the sustainable management, 
production and use of these biological resources (micro-organism, plants and animals). 
This programme (FP7) brings together all relevant actors (appropriate research disciplines 
and industrial sectors, farmers, forest owners, consumers, etc.) to develop the basis for new, 
sustainable, safer, affordable, eco-efficient and competitive products … Eco-efficient 
products are less polluting and less resource-intensive in production, and allow a more 
effective management of biological resources‖ ([36], p. 3). 
The narrative conflates ―renewable‖ and ―eco-efficient‖ with ―sustainable‖; i.e., less polluting, less 
wasteful and less ―resource-intensive in production‖. This conflation assumes that biological resources 
will replace synthetic products such as chemicals, whilst organic waste will itself become a new 
resource (i.e., raw material) for further productive processes. Consequently, as Gavin Bridge argues 
more generally [8], these ―raw materials‖ are constructed as specifically sustainable resources through 
the assumption that living nature is abundant because it is inherently renewable (i.e., it reproduces) and 
that using waste matter is eco-efficient because it would otherwise be thrown away.  
In projecting abundance onto nature, the KBBE narrative creates an imperative for investment in 
new knowledge and technologies—for identifying natural characteristics, for extracting specific 
components, for recomposing their elements, for using the novel combinations, and ultimately for 
running ―biorefineries‖ (see below). Knowledge provides the means to develop the new resources that 
will then provide the basis for new products and processes, thus linking Europe‘s global 
competitiveness with its environmental responsibilities. This framing of sustainability provides the 
rationale for promoting and supporting research funding (and the later re-regulation of markets) on 
non-food uses of living material (e.g., plants) at the genetic and molecular level. According to the 
vision document of the Plants for the Future Technology Platform, for example, ―Europe cannot afford 
to miss out on the benefits offered by plant genomics and biotechnology‖ ([37], p. 17). 
The need for such technology to provide ―sustainable‖ resources assumes that consumer demand 
stimulates global markets and global pressures on natural resources, e.g., land and fossil fuels; such 
pressures generate greater competition over resource use (e.g., food vs. energy), deplete them and 
create more waste. As the later Strategic Research Agenda of the same Technology Platform states: 
―This implies that the worldwide demand for feed will increase dramatically as a result of 
the growing demand for high-value animal protein … In addition, it is now well 
established that feed and food are increasingly competing with non-food products  
(bio-energy and industrial products, such as bio-plastics for packaging) for acreage 
systems … All the above facts mean that more arable land will have to be farmed for feed 
and food or crop productivity will have to be boosted significantly‖ ([38], p. 3).  
From that problem-diagnosis, the KBBE narrative promotes a techno-knowledge fix: more efficient 
technoscientific techniques and knowledge can ensure the ―sustainable‖ replenishment of capital. The 
real subsumption of nature can intensify the productivity of those natural resources [6].  
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This intensification strategy has a circular reasoning which casts resource shortages as deficiencies 
in resource productivity, rather than in inherent limits of natural resources. From that diagnosis, such 
deficiencies can only be overcome through further intensification rather than further extraction. 
Therefore we must develop new knowledge and technologies which will improve agricultural 
productivity and efficiency in response to external market pressures. For example: 
―Faced with the conflict between rising demand, environmental concerns and increased 
land competition, the application of new agricultural technologies can help provide a more 
sustainable solution. Advances in plant breeding methods could help boost crop yields and 
quality (palatability and digestibility), while reducing costs. These new technologies will 
enable European farmers to be competitive in the global feed market‖ ([38], p. 15). 
Alongside greater commodification and privatization, intensification will also encourage further 
monocultural agricultural practices with attendant high-input resource usages (e.g., fertilizers) and 
vulnerabilities (e.g., pests). In the KBBE narrative, hazards of intensification are attributed instead to 
threats from an external nature, which thereby warrant techno-fixes. For example: 
―Adverse environmental conditions are major factors directly reducing yield or, at least, 
impairing plant performance … Reduced rainfall and increased water requirements will 
affect crop yields and tree growth. Plants able to withstand drought, cold and salt stress 
would not only stabilise yield potentials but also contribute to reducing the impact of 
agriculture on the environment … These adverse environmental conditions also increase 
susceptibility to pests and pathogens, resulting in higher consumption of agri-chemicals 
and further yield and quality losses‖ ([38], p. 46).  
In this way, global competition and resource vulnerabilities are naturalized as exogenous, objective 
forces which must be addressed to ensure that Europe does not fall further behind its rivals. In this 
framing, technoscientific developments are presented as the means to address this concern. When 
launching the KBBE agenda in 2005, the Science and Research Commissioner Janez Potočnik 
declared: ―Research in agriculture… can be a perfect example of how science can unlock potential for 
human well being‖ ([27], p. 12). The overall construction of sustainable resources is premised on the 
need to compete more effectively in a global market where natural resources are both ―abundant‖ 
(because they are renewable) and ―scarce‖ because they are threatened by depletion, wastage and 
vulnerabilities to exogenous hazards (e.g., pests). Ecological damage endemic to industrial production 
systems is instead attributed to inefficient use of resources [18]. Thus these environmental problems 
are not simply obstacles from a recalcitrant nature; they also represent opportunities for societal 
progress, if only the barriers to technoscientific development were removed. 
4.2. Nature = Fixed Capital 
In the imagined techno-knowledge fix, all biological resources become potential raw material for 
producing and circulating sustainable capital. Natural recourses are also characterized as machines 
through industrial metaphors. For example: ―In addition to the countryside‘s role as a ―food factory‖, it 
could be used to grow renewable bio-resources as sustainable raw materials for our energy needs and 
for industry‖ ([27], p. 5). So rather than extend the ecological fix through the externalization of costs 
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and their subsequent internalization [17], such metaphorical framings extend agri-technological 
innovation systems beyond food production. In so doing, they incorporate a more diverse set of 
stakeholders and potential beneficiaries (e.g., farmers, industrialists, energy companies, consumers, 
environmentalists etc.). Framing nature as a literal ―oil well‖ or ―food factory‖ facilitates this 
enrolment of diverse groups in the over-arching vision of the KBBE as a techno-knowledge fix. It can 
even include environmental NGOs advocating sustainable resources derived from nature. 
The narrative presents both an opportunity and an imperative that links several diverse industrial 
sectors along a newly imagined value chain which encompasses food, animal feed, energy, industrial 
products, etc. The supposed inherent properties of living matter (―biocrude‖), especially plants, 
become a universal sustainable resource; for example, the predecessor to the Biofuels Technology 
Platform claims that ‖New developments are ongoing for transforming the biomass into a liquid 
―biocrude‖, which can be further refined, used for energy production or sent to a gasifier‖ ([39], p. 21). 
As a renewable resource, living matter can be utilized in new, more efficient ways that will ensure 
environmental and economic sustainability.  
The vision of the techno-knowledge fix is exemplified by the ―integrated biorefinery‖, here defined 
by the Biofuels TP predecessor: 
―All alternative possibilities of integration will have to be explored. Conversion of 
intermediates and residues into valuable products is a central objective of the integrated 
biorefinery. The co-production of fuels and co-products, i.e., basic chemicals for synthesis 
purposes or high valuable minor components, can meet the challenges of economy and 
sustainability.‖ ([39], p. 22). 
To benefit from the renewable and eco-efficient properties of nature, implicit in the reworking of 
capital as sustainable capital, necessitates the reorientation of social and institutional frameworks in 
response to the imperative of horizontal integration of numerous industries denoted by the 
―biorefinery‖ concept. According to the Technology Platform Plants for the Future, for example:  
―… the production of green energy will also face the exceptional challenge of global 
industrial restructuring in which the very different value chains of agricultural production 
and the biorefining industries must be merged with the value chains of the energy 
providers‖ ([38], p. 33). 
Such integration requires flexibility amongst industrial sectors, individual firms and state agencies 
in order to link diverse technoscientific developments and applications, e.g., crops, animal feed, energy, 
environmental remediation, and industrial and medical products [40]. This integration is celebrated as 
an environmental boon that will lead to the sustainable economies of the future. 
Other mechanical and informatic metaphors reinforce the restructuring imperative by fetishizing 
human powers as the properties of natural (and especially molecular-biological) resources; plants 
become ―cell factories‖, ―cell micro-computers‖, ―biotech pistons‖ etc. For example:  
―… biotech employs micro-organisms, such as yeasts, moulds and bacteria as so-called 
―cell factories‖ and enzymes to produce goods and services. This implies developing and 
producing chemicals at the cellular level by exploiting and adjusting natural processes in 
living organisms to generate the substances and enzymes needed by industry‖ ([27], p. 9).  
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Extraordinary powers are attributed to natural resources, especially at the molecular level in 
reference to (bio-)technoscientific developments and applications [41]. These metaphors thereby raise 
expectations about the economic, societal and ecological benefits that certain knowledge will provide; 
in particular, laboratory knowledge concerned with genetics, genomics, proteomics etc., which 
contrast to the possibilities offered by other approaches such as agro-ecology. Long before the KBBE 
agenda, molecular biology and genetic engineering were seen as ―breakthrough‖ technologies, which 
not only offer ―total‖ but also ―universal‖ solutions to societal problems. Consequently, laboratory 
knowledge is valorized over other forms, which means that there is an ―underestimation or neglect of 
the indirect, global or systemic and long-term impacts of agricultural systems and innovations‖, argue 
Vanloqueren and Baret ([33], p. 979).  
Extending that legacy, the KBBE narrative likewise emphasizes biotechnological knowledge,  
e.g., for the redesign of crops to increase their productivity, the use of biological processes in industrial 
production, the extraction of energy from biomass, etc. The EU‘s expert advisors have elaborated 
imaginaries for bio-based products, which aim to ―Improve agricultural land productivity in a 
sustainable way in the EU and in third countries, e.g., through yield increase, reuse of degraded land, 
use of unused land, better land management, cropping system, etc.‖ As they also note, ―The fact that a 
product is bio-based is not alone a proof of its sustainability; a range of other factors need to be 
considered (e.g., health, safety, environmental effects, waste).‖ This uncertain link becomes a rationale 
to set European standards which can facilitate sustainable ―green‖ products ([42], pp. 16, 10).  
4.3. Capitalization = Societal Progress 
The techno-knowledge fix of new (bio-)technoscientific developments and applications, designed to 
intensify the productivity of (living) nature, is embedded in a contradictory and circular neoliberal 
logic. Global market demand is represented as inevitably increasing, thereby intensifying the existing 
pressures on land use alongside creating new pressures (e.g., non-food uses), which will necessitate the 
intensification of land productivity. Through this reductionist framing, private interests are presented 
as societal needs; such societal needs, in turn, can only be satisfied through (bio-)techoscientific 
innovation (e.g., increasing agricultural productivity through genetic engineering) and private property 
regimes to incentivize this innovation, e.g., intellectual property (IP). This is similar to Kathleen 
McAfee‘s argument that such reductionism discursively legitimates genetic research as ―unique‖ and 
―inventive‖, which justifies commodification, whilst characterizing other efforts and activities  
(e.g., breeding) as ―non-scientific‖, not inventive and not legitimate property [41].  
Through such a reductionist separation of knowledge from nature, technoscientific attributes 
become intrinsic to a particular technology or artefact itself, rather than to the social relations of its 
production [32]. Technofixes for saving nature help to justify its commodification [43]. This enables 
the enclosure of (bio-)technoscientific knowledge through private property regimes, by extending on 
the classical liberal concept that only human labour can confer value upon nature [44]. In the KBBE 
narrative, for example, the integrated biorefinery mentioned above is meant to turn plant matter into a 
diverse array of products: 
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―In the long term, the increased demand for agricultural land will require increased 
productivity and extraction efficiency. For this demand to be met, it will be necessary to 
develop multifunctional crops that can be processed in integrated biorefineries in which the 
utilisation of feedstock is maximised. For example, in the case of biomass crops, in 
addition to serving as a source of lignocellulose, feedstock could also be used as a platform 
for the production of specific biochemicals that represent in their own right, high-value 
industrial feedstocks‖ ([38], p. 37). 
Nature here is to be intensified and mined for interchangeable raw materials that can then be 
extracted, processed and commodified through new private property regimes; thus nature, and 
particularly, living matter, becomes new and exploitable ―oil wells‖, as articulated at an international 
conference on the biorefinery: 
―Participants included members of the forestry, automotive, pulp and paper, petroleum, 
chemicals, agriculture, financial, and research communities … It was noted by DOE [US 
Dept of Energy] and EU that both the U.S. and EU have a common goal: Agriculture in  
the 21st century will become the oil wells of the future—providing fuels, chemicals and 
products for a global community‖[45]. 
In this sense, living matter is constructed as an economic asset that can be renewably cultivated. 
However, its market value depends upon the intensification of nature‘s productivity—which must be 
enhanced through the ―the use of biotechnology for the conversion of biomass and waste into  
value-added products‖, according to an EPOBIO report ([46], pp. 17, 18). In this way, market value 
depends upon new molecular and genetic research which has ―the potential to produce both chemicals 
and biofuels in an integrated biorefinery‖ ([47], p. 10).  
As mentioned already, the integrated biorefinery links together diverse private interests such as 
major agriculture industry sectors (e.g., seed, fertilizer, pesticide, genetically modified crops etc.) with 
energy sectors (e.g., transport fuels, electricity generation, automotive industries etc.). These sectors 
treat nature as an economic asset whose productivity must be intensified in order to appropriate market 
value. Through industry-wide trade associations and the European Technology Platforms, these private 
interests have influenced EU policy with regards to biofuels policy; as well as research subsidy, state 
support includes market incentives for ―eco-efficient‖ technoscientific innovation. One ETP forerunner 
argued that: 
―Legislation promoting biofuels could be based on tax incentives, mandates to use biofuels 
or via emission standards. Creating a market advantage for biofuels will also speed up 
RTD [research and technological development] and make it more target-oriented‖  
([39], p. 26).  
Subsequently, the research agenda for biorefineries has helped to implement the Action Plan for 
Bio-based Products, which forms part of the state-led Lead Market Initiative [30,42,48]. Here the 
KBBE agenda helps to reorient policy frameworks in order to reposition European companies higher 
up the value chain, especially by acquiring patents on (bio-)technoscientific and engineering 
knowledge for biorefineries. For applying biotechnology through a bio-economy, a trans-Atlantic 
research network emphasized patents as a key driver:  
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―A significant challenge and opportunity that impacts scientists across the industrial and 
academic sectors with relevance to both fundamental research and scientific collaboration 
is Intellectual Property (IP). While not specifically a scientific challenge, it certainly is 
driven by and has a strong influence on science. Successful resolution of IP issues in any 
given research area can and will dramatically affect scientific progress‖ ([49], p. 17). 
The agenda emphasizes the commodification of knowledge within new patent regimes that are 
meant to promote product development from natural resources—in the name of sustainable energy, 
bio-based products and societal progress.  
5. Alternative Imaginaries and Research Agendas 
The Commission‘s agricultural research priorities have been criticized by some NGOs. To evaluate 
the Commission biotech strategy, an environmental NGO compared the societal benefits of organic 
agriculture and agri-environmental schemes, on the one hand, with agri-food biotech, on the other. 
Benefits were quantitatively analyzed in terms of industrial competitiveness, market diversity, resource 
impacts and job creation. On all those criteria, agbiotech failed to achieve the strategic objectives of 
the Commission‘s Lisbon agenda. By contrast, organic farming within a rural development policy 
provides a competitive alternative, argues the report [50]. Other NGOs too have criticized the 
dominant KBBE agenda and have counterposed alternatives [51].  
Since at least the 1990s, small-scale and organic farmers‘ organizations too have been promoting 
alternatives to the dominant agri-industrial model. Advocating ―sustainable rural communities‖, they 
have emphasized farmers‘ knowledge of local biological resources for quality agriculture, in turn as a 
basis for consumer support through short food-supply chains.  
The Commission has financed some research on organic farming, e.g., genomics tools for 
identifying pest-resistant crop varieties [52]. Since 2006 organic farming researchers and industry 
organizations have attempted to gain Commission funding for a Technology Platform Organics,  
on grounds that organic systems ―are an important and fast-growing part of the European  
knowledge-based bio-economy‖. Although that attempt did not succeed, they built broad stakeholder 
support, including relevant commercial actors and environmental NGOs. Eventually they published a 
Vision for an Organic Food and Farming Research Agenda to 2025, recasting key terms from the 
KBBE narrative: ―the innovations generated by the organic sector have played an important role in 
pushing agriculture and food production generally towards sustainability, quality and low risk 
technologies‖ ([53], p. 9). 
They also recast farmers‘ competitiveness in terms of appropriating agro-ecological knowledge for 
higher productivity:  
―Organic farming is a highly knowledge-based form of agriculture involving both high 
tech and indigenous knowledges and is based on the farmer‘s aptitude for autonomous 
decision making. The weakness of organic agriculture so far remains its insufficient 
productivity and the stability of yields. This could be solved by means of appropriate ― 
eco-functional intensification‖, i.e., more efficient use of natural resources, improved 
nutrient recycling techniques and agro-ecological methods for enhancing diversity and the 
health of soils, crops and livestock‖ ([53], p. 34).  
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Their Vision report was followed by a Strategic Research Agenda, which emphasised the need for 
knowledge networks among farmers and researchers:  
―New approaches of participatory research, knowledge exchange networks, development 
of decision-making tools (including internet based tools) as well as coaching and 
mentoring are frequently advocated… At the same time, organic farmers and growers 
contribute actively to the development of new knowledge and techniques‖ ([53], p. 39).  
Some research proposals from TP Organics have been incorporated into FP7, as well as into CORE 
Organic, a programme which links funds from national research budgets. Some calls for research 
proposals mention organic production methods, while others emphasise other key terms such as 
enhancing soil management, recycling organic waste, replacing chemical pesticides, etc. In these ways, 
an alternative has gained modest place in EU-level research agendas, thus countering the general  
lock-out of agro-ecological methods [33]. As a basis for these gains, proponents recast key terms from 
dominant KBBE narratives and presented alternative agendas as broadly relevant to agriculture beyond 
organic farming.  
6. Conclusions 
As the preceding analysis has shown, the ―knowledge-based bio-economy‖ (KBBE) has divergent 
narratives, whose dominant one is a new strategy for sustainable capital. This promotes  
bio-technoscience as the means to reconcile environmental and economic sustainability. It frames the 
sustainability problem as an inefficiency to be overcome through a techno-knowledge fix, especially 
through molecular-level changes. Here ecological sustainability means a benign eco-efficient 
productivity through resources which are renewable, reproducible and therefore sustainable—by 
contrast to inanimate nature (e.g., minerals), which lacks those characteristics. This imaginary of 
cornucopian living resources encourages political and financial investment in a techno-knowledge fix.  
Within this imaginary, mechanical-informatic metaphors (e.g., cell factories) are invested in 
Nature—which thus represents human qualities usually ascribed to industrial activities, entities and 
products [27]. These metaphors narrowly define the social, economic and ecological potential of 
natural resources—as intensified productivity seeking commercial products suitable for global markets. 
The techno-knowledge fix fetishizes specific social forms of natural resources (and of knowledges) as 
inherent characteristics, thus naturalizing their potential privatization and commodification.  
This technoscientific imperative is embedded in global market demands that extend the continuing 
(over-)consumption of natural resources. As a response, techno-knowledge fixes are meant to expand 
resource availability, while also competing globally in ―bio-based‖ sectors. This solution requires 
changes in policy goals, agendas and frameworks so that they can be adapted to commercial 
imperatives of sustainable capital.  
All this forms the basis for sustainable capital as a politico-economic strategy to sustain capital 
accumulation through proprietary knowledge of nature‘s productivity. Sustainability is framed as 
knowledge that enables the intensification of natural resource productivity, to be unlocked with new 
knowledge embedded in technoscientific innovation. European Technology Platforms establish vision 
statements and set priorities that extend commercial imperatives into the research process; they 
emphasize research which could eventually facilitate commercial products and proprietary knowledge. 
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Intrinsic to this drive for global competitiveness, proprietary knowledge can protect any capital 
return on innovation expenditure necessary to increase the productivity of nature in the first place. 
Many natural resources otherwise would be freely reproducible for re-use and exchange, e.g., seeds 
and enzymes. As a valuable resource, nature has to be protected from competitors. Or, more precisely, 
knowledge of natural resources has to be protected, since the capture of market value from knowledge 
depends upon intellectual property rights (IPRs). These play multiple narrative roles—as an indicator 
of Europe lagging behind its competitors, as an imperative for a European patent procedure  
to overcome obstacles, and as a flexible explanation blaming market-unfriendly policies for  
technological failure.  
As a political-economic strategy, sustainable capital combines the formal and real subsumption of 
nature in new ways, while also going beyond them [6]. Real subsumption redesigns nature for 
intensified production, while formal subsumption identifies and extracts components for recomposing 
them in new products with higher market value. As a distinctive feature, this dual subsumption 
emphasizes natural resource functions, rather than specific forms which could fulfill those functions. 
The intensification of ―natural‖ processes through new knowledge reorients policy frameworks to the 
demands of capital accumulation.  
Sustainable capital has novel features in recasting the resource problem. Earlier regimes sought to 
increase labour productivity through mechanical energy from fossil fuels, thus causing enormous 
ecological damage. As a novel diagnosis, the KBBE agenda frames the problem as energy and other 
resource shortages, resulting from their inefficient use and consequently wasting resources. This waste 
is framed as both a problem and opportunity—not simply as a ―negative side-effect‖ to be managed.  
As a remedy, research seeks ways to make capital itself renewable through a techno-knowledge fix 
that goes beyond the current dependence upon inanimate natural resources such as oil and gas, metals, 
minerals etc. Research agendas promise sustainable resource usage through intensified, more efficient 
biological activity of renewable resources. This promises a dual benefit—ensuring the renewable 
replacement of natural resources for the foreseeable future, as well as shortening the timescale that is 
currently necessary for the geological formation of ―non-renewable‖ resources.  
Renewable replacements need to be found not only throughout the value chain (e.g., to replace 
resource inputs, machinery, energy etc.), but also within a broader shift in ―ecological regime‖ [18,54]. 
This regime shift invests great expectations for unlocking the productive potential of natural resources. 
In this cornucopian resource imaginary, technoscientific innovation will develop new forms of ―fixed‖ 
bio-capital (e.g., plants or plant cells as bio-factories), new forms of non-human ―labour‖  
(e.g., micro-organisms as bio-catalysts), new forms of energy supply (e.g., biomass and biofuels) and 
new forms of ―life‖ with greater biological productivity, as the basis for new forms of surplus value.  
Defined as ―the eco-efficient transformation of renewable biological resources‖, the KBBE is 
sometimes equated with biological productivity, implicitly distinct from labour productivity. For those 
cornucopian resource imaginaries to gain commercial success, however, a techno-knowledge fix also 
depends upon exploiting new combinations of ―living‖ and ―dead‖ labour. These include the following: 
expertise in lab research, fixed capital in bio-refineries and conventional agri-industrial labour for 
providing large-scale biomass, especially in the global South.  
As a divergent imaginary of a bio-economy, agro-ecological approaches have been promoted for 
enhancing farmers‘ knowledge of natural resources. Recently this has been elaborated as a means to 
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increase on-farm biological productivity, e.g., through eco-functional intensification, dependent upon 
expanding a knowledge commons. Dominant biotechnological agendas have generally locked  
out agro-ecological approaches [33]. Nevertheless such alternatives can achieve gains through  
well-organized stakeholder networks, as this case study illustrates.  
The stakes have been raised by the Europe 2020 strategy, which promotes ―smart, sustainable and 
inclusive growth‖, especially through ―resource efficient technologies‖. The European Commission 
plans to launch European Innovation Partnerships to speed up the development of the technologies 
needed to meet societal challenges, especially for ―building the bio-economy by 2020‘ ([55], p. 10).  
In this new policy context of the KBBE, alternative versions could either be marginalized or else 
become counter-hegemonic. Here lies a strategic question: ―how do counter-hegemonic forces 
challenge routinized categories and naturalized institutions, generate new subject positions and social 
forces, and struggle for new projects and strategies?‖ ([56], p. 163). As a related question: Can 
alternatives be more effectively promoted by representing them as complementary to the dominant 
agenda—or else as contradictory?  
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